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INTRODUCTION
Trade between Japan and the People's Republic of China commenced in
1950, though commercial relations fluctuated greatly for a decade thereafter,
reflecting the instability of political relations between the two countries. As
China's relationship with the Soviet Union, a major trading partner, deteri-
orated in the late 1950's, Chinese planners began to increase trade with non-
communist nations. This led to the advent of the "friendly trade"' between
Japan and China in 1960, which was formalized by Liao and Takasaki in a
Memorandum in late 1962. That Memorandum initiated a period of stable
expansion of Sino-Japanese trade, which has been interrupted only once-by
the 1966 Cultural Revolution. Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, trade
between the two countries has increased steadily.
In 1972, the total amount of Sino-Japanese trade reached a record high of
$1.1 billion2 including both imports and exports, an increase of 22 per cent over
1971. China imported Japanese goods worth $608,921,000, an increase of
5.3 per cent over the preceding year, while Japanese imports from China
totaled $491,116,000, an increase of 52 per cent. The excess of Japanese ex-
ports over imports, which has existed since 1965, has gradually decreased
from a high of $315 million in 1970, to $255 million in 1971, and to $118 million
in 1972. In spite of its expansion, Sino-Japanese trade comprised only 2.1
per cent of Japan's total foreign trade for 1972. Japan's trade with other coun-
tries has expanded even more rapidly than its trade with China.3
The Sino-Japanese trade in the first half of 1973 again increased significantly
following the resumption of diplomatic relations between Japan and the People's
*Research Associate, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO).
I A discussion of "friendly trade" appears in the text at p. 241.
2 Unless otherwise noted, all amounts are expressed in American dollars.
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PROGRESS OF SINO-JAPANESE TRADE
(Unit: $1,000)
Japanese Percentage of Japanese Percentage of
Year Exports Total Japanese Imports Total Japanese
to China Exports (%) from China Imports
1955 $ 28,547 1.40 $ 80,778 3.30
1960 2,726 0.06 20,729 0.50
1965 245,036 2.90 224,705 2.80
1969 390,803 2.40 234,540 1.60
1970 568,878 2.90 253,818 1.30
1971 578,188 2.40 323,172 1.60
1972 608,921 2.10 491,116 2.10
Compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Finance. For a complete listing of trade values for
1960 through 1966, see L. LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 69 (1969).
SINO-JAPANESE TRADE 241
Republic of China in September, 1972. Japan's exports to China in the first
half of 1973 totaled $472,660,000, an increase of 55.3 per cent over the same
period in the preceding year, and imports totaled $398,830,000, up 81.4 per
cent. The export of steel, chemicals, machinery, and tools occupied more than
90 per cent of the export from Japan in this period. The import of textiles
almost doubled over the first half of 1972, occupying 49 per cent of the total
import. The import of coal to Japan increased 2.6 times, and the import of
petroleum was commenced, though initially in a small quantity.4
I
THE STRUCTURE OF SINO-JAPANESE TRADE
As formal diplomatic relations between Japan and the People's Republic
of China are a relatively recent development, Sino-Japanese trade has been
conducted in a number of different ways. From 1950 to 1958, trade was con-
ducted by private companies which entered into agreements for the exchange
of goods. These agreements caused a steady increase in trade between the
two countries, but the advances were not lasting. Increasing diplomatic and
political pressures from Taiwan as well as the United States led to a more
hostile attitude in Japan toward the People's Republic, culminating in China s
suspension of all trade with Japan in 1958. The first significant structural
arrangement developed two years later.
A. Friendly Trade
In August of 1960, Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China
proposed three political principles or prerequisites for trade.5 The Japanese
were not to: (1) obstruct the establishment of diplomatic relations between
4
EXPORT AND IMPORT OF PRINCIPAL GOODS
(Unit: $1,000)
Japanese Exports Japanese Imports
Product 1972 Ist Half Product 1972 1st Half
1973 1973
Textiles $ 45,902 $ 27,577 Foodstuffs $122,522 $ 63,898
Chemical Textiles and
fertilizers 119,761 70,912 textile goods 197,184 195,556
Synthetic Raw silk 114,902 97,833
plastics 26,488 14,564
Steel 244,728 242,430 Clothing 18,043 17,599
Machinery Silk fabrics 15,797 25,584
and tools 78,819 69,791
Bearings 11,478 10,442 Soybeans 37,963 22,239
Metal processing Coal 5,396 3,701
machines 6,477 3,481
Automobiles 17,612 12,869 Petroleum - 1,622
Compiled by the Japanese Ministry of Finance.
3 JIH-PEN WEN-T'I WEN-CHIEN HUI-PIEN (COLLECTED DOCUMENTS ON JAPANESE PROBLEMS)
213 (1958).
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Japan and the People's Republic of China; (2) participate in the formation of
two Chinas; or (3) regard the People's Republic of China as an enemy. In
an accompanying statement, Chou En-lai stated that it would be possible to con-
clude private foreign trade contracts even before the reinstatement of dip-
lomatic relations between Japan and the People's Republic if both countries
would display a friendly spirit. When Japanese businessmen accepted Chou's
proposal, "friendly trade" was begun.
The Japanese enterprises participating in friendly trade had to be
recognized as friendly enterprises by the People's Republic of China. In
order to be designated "friendly," a Japanese enterprise had to declare that
it would strictly observe (1) Chou's three principles, (2) the rule of insepara-
bility of politics and economics, and (3) after April, 1970, Premier Chou En-lai's
"Four Conditions. '6 Japanese enterprises which accepted these principles
and conditions could be officially designated as friendly firms or enterprises
by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade or the Japan-
China Friendship Association of China at the recommendation of friendship
groups in Japan, such as the Association for the Promotion of International
Trade or the Headquarters of the Japan-China Friendly Association.
With normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China on
September 29, 1972, the basic spirit of these principles and conditions were
included in the Japan-China joint Declaration. After March 7, 1973, a Japanese
enterprise desiring to participate in Sino-Japanese trade could do so simply
by informing the Chinese that it accepted the spirit of the Joint Declaration.
Such friendly trade comprises approximately ninety per cent of current
Sino-Japanese trade.
B. The Liao-Takasaki Memorandum
In September, 1962, the late Mr. Kenzo Matsumura, a member of the
Japanese Diet, and Premier Chou En-lai agreed that because the prospects
for early signing of a Sino-Japanese trade agreement were dim, an interim
arrangement was necessary to promote trade between the two countries. Pur-
suant to that agreement, the late Mr. Tatsunosuke Takasaki of Japan and Mr.
Liao Cheng-chih of China signed a Memorandum two months later setting
forth a five-year plan for Sino-Japanese trade. Expected total amounts of
trade per year were established, as were the major products each nation would
export.7 Based on this Memorandum, the Chinese established a liaison office
in Tokyo in September, 1964, and a Japanese office opened in Peking in
January, 1965.
Since 1968, memorandum trade agreements have been concluded each
year between the trade offices of each country. Annually a plan is agreed upon,
which includes specification of principal goods for export and import. Japanese
6 The Four Conditions indicate that the People's Republic of China will not trade with Japanese
enterprises which (I) support Chiang Kai-Shek and Park Chung Hee, (2) invest heavily in Taiwan or
South Korea, (3) participate in the United States invasion of Indochina, or (4) are Japanese-
American joint-venture enterprises or subsidiaries of United States enterprises in Japan.
7 4 JIH-PEN WEN-T'I WEN-CHIEN HUI-PIEN (COLLECTED DOCUMENTS ON JAPANESE PROBLEMS)
90 (1963).
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interests are coordinated by the Japan-China Trade General Liaison Council,
a business organization which has organized councils for specific goods classified
by commodity. Japanese enterprises desiring to participate in this trade are
required to join the relevant council.
C. Japan-China Trade Agreement
Mr. Chi Yeh-Shao, an official of the Ministry of External Trade of the
People's Republic of China, came to Japan on August 16, 1973, to negotiate
with the Japanese government for the formulation of the first trade agree-
ment between the countries. The governments arrived at mutual agreement on
the following points: (1) most-favored-nation status concerning customs,
customs facilities, handling of merchandise for export and import, inland
customs, and so forth; (2) the goods which the countries are mutually interested
in trading and the quantity of import and export for each item; (3) yen or yuan
or other currency of payment having convertibility; (4) international market
prices as the basis of trade; (5) an annual committee meeting to be held be-
tween the Japanese government and the government of the People's Republic;
and (6) a term of three years, renewable every year thereafter.
The Japan-China Trade Agreement was signed on January 5, 1974, incor-
porating these points and superseding the memorandum agreements negotiated
annually since 1968. Henceforth, Sino-Japanese trade will be carried out in two
forms: friendly trade and trade based on the list of materials for import
and export set forth in the Japan-China Trade Agreement.
III
CURRENT TRADE BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA
A. Negotiation of a Contract
Sino-Japanese trade can be divided into two categories according to the form
and the place of negotiations, namely the Canton Fair and Peking negotiations.
In addition, more "Tokyo negotiations" have been conducted recently, with
Chinese teams coming to Japan to participate.
Unlike trading with the capitalist countries, it is difficult to get concrete
responses to inquiries when trading with China. Particularly in the case of
exports to China, reactions to offers are slow and it is almost impossible to
sign an export contract for any commodity not included in the Chinese import
plan. Accordingly, Japanese enterprises attempt to fully inform state-run
Chinese trade corporations of Japanese products by providing catalogs, pam-
phlets, and other information. Japanese enterprises also must participate
in negotiations at the Canton Fair and in the exhibitions of Japanese goods held
in China. Finally, it is often necessary to make use of other opportunities-such
as the interchange of technical missions-in order to provoke a response.
1. Canton Fair
The Canton Fair was first held in 1957 under the auspices of the China
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Council for the Promotion of International Trade with the objective of ex-
porting Chinese products to the overseas Chinese living in Hong Kong,
Macao, Singapore, and other Southeast Asian countries. At present, negotiations
for both exports and imports are made under the auspices of the Chinese
state-run trade corporations. Participants come from all parts of the world.
The Canton Fair is held twice a year, once in the spring (April 15th to May
15th) and again in the autumn (October 15th to November 15th).8 The con-
tracts negotiated at the Canton Fair amount to about forty per cent of the total
of China's foreign trade.
Japan has participated in the Canton Fair since 1961. Applications for
participation from the Japanese friendly firms are collected by the Association
for the Promotion of International Trade of Japan and are submitted to the
Chinese. Invitations are sent to the friendly firms by the China Council for
the Promotion of International Trade. Trading firms which receive invitations
often retain production firms to assist in the negotiations at the Fair. This
allows Japanese trading firms to use the superior technical knowledge of
producing industries without committing the resources necessary to develop
expertise regarding each individual product.
Once a contact is made at the Fair, the Japanese firm makes concrete
offers for the export or import of items in compliance with its trading plan.
The Japanese firm then must wait for an appointment to begin negotiations.
When negotiations begin, China is represented by members of the state-run
trade corporation handling the commodity under discussion. On the Japanese
side, generally the manufacturer or the intended consumer handles the nego-
tiations, as they possess the necessary technical knowledge. They are assisted
by the trading firm with which they are associated. If the transaction is large
and the negotiations successful, the Chinese may make allotments among several
of the Japanese trading firms. After any such allotment, a contract is signed by
the Japanese trading firms and the Chinese trade corporation involved.,
Generally, negotiations for Chinese export to Japan occur during the first
half of each session of the Canton Fair and negotiations for Japanese export
to China during the latter half. In many cases the contracts cannot be signed
during the session, and additional negotiations are carried on in Peking.
2. Peking Negotiations
When complex machinery or large quantities of materials are being con-
sidered for trade, the parties often do not limit negotiations to the periods
during the Canton Fair. This is especially true when China desires to import
substantial amounts of machinery, plants, iron, steel, fertilizers, and similar
products from Japan. The process normally begins with a specific written
inquiry by the Chinese, covering specifications, quantities, and other necessary
details, except the date of delivery and price. The Japanese trading firms may
make counteroffers by letter or telegram, but generally the complexity of the
S Canton is now officially known by the Chinese as Kwangchow.
9 The other party to a contract for Sino-Japanese trade is always the Peking head office of
the state-run trade corporation.
SINO-JAPANESE TRADE
matters necessitate the dispatch of negotiating teams to Peking. Hence these
business talks are termed "Peking negotiations." As at the Canton Fair, the
Japanese negotiating effort is generally headed by technical experts from manu-
facturing or producing enterprises, with officials of the trading firms acting
in a supportive capacity. When negotiations are concluded, a protocol is ex-
changed, and after any necessary allotments are made to the various Japanese
trading firms, contracts are signed by the trading firms and the Chinese trade
corporations. Because of the extent of recent trade, there are now about fifty
employees of Japanese enterprises permanently stationed in Peking for such
negotiations.
B. Trade Control
With the signing of the Japan-China Trade Agreement, the parties
granted reciprocal most-favored-nation status, thus eliminating the discrim-
inatory tariffs both nations had maintained. The People's Republic of China will
reduce the import tariff on items from Japan from the normal rate to the
minimum rate, a reduction of approximately one-third. Prior to the Trade
Agreement, Japan was applying its statutory rate to imports from China, but
the most-favored-nation status invokes the GATT conventional rate which is
half the statutory rate. Japan, however, has a list of some thirty-two products,
including agricultural products, hides and leather, and computers, the import
of which is forbidden, and this policy will apply to China as well as all other
trading nations. In addition, the import of meat from China, particularly beef
and pork, is prohibited at present because of hoof-and-mouth disease. Finally,
Japanese trade is presently also subject to some control from the International
Coordinating Committee on Strategic Trade with Communist Countries
(COCOM), a group formed by Japan and the Western nations to regulate
trade with the communist bloc nations.
C. Payments
Trade negotiations between Japan and China had to be suspended when
the floating exchange rate system was adopted for the British pound in June,
1972, because the British pound was the main currency used for payment
in Sino-Japanese trade. In response, the Yen-Yuan Settlement was adopted
between Japan and China in August, 1972. But this payment arrangement
was far from perfect, as it was adversely affected by the recent dollar devaluation
and the dollar sales for Deutsche marks in Europe. Therefore, Japan (through
the Bank of Tokyo) and China (through the Bank of China) revised the Yen-
Yuan Settlement agreement in August, 1973.
The main points of this argument are as follows. (1) The Japanese yen
and the Chinese yuan shall be added to the British pound and the French franc
as payment currencies in Sino-Japanese trade. The importing party shall have
the option of choosing the currency in which payment is to be made.' 0 (2) The
10 Although the choice of payment currency is theoretically the option of the importer, Chinese
imports from Japan are entirely quoted in yuan and Japanese imports from China are, in substance,
quoted in yuan in eighty to ninety per cent of the transactions because yuan credits are used.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
yen-yuan exchange rate shall be quoted by the Bank of China according to the
market rate. (3) The Bank of China shall open a yen deposit account in the
Foreign Exchange Bank of Japan, and the latter a yuan deposit account in the
Bank of China. All yen-yuan transactions involved in Sino-Japanese trade shall
be conducted through these accounts. (4) The yen balance held by the Bank of
China and the yuan balance held by the Foreign Exchange Bank of Japan shall
be converted into British pounds and be drafted or transferred into a fixed
deposit. Thereafter, the conversion from the yuan to the pound and the con-
version from the yen to the pound shall be effected at the market rate. The
balance in the yuan account can be used only for trade settlement between
Japan and China and may not be used for payment abroad; it may, however,
be transferred among foreign exchange banks of Japan within Japan. The
initial term of this agreement was for one year, but it is renewable annually.
Japan enjoyed a surplus of some $118 million in her trade with China in
1972, and thus the yuan deposit of the Foreign Exchange Bank of Japan in the
Bank of China has increased significantly. In the negotiations leading to the
Yen-Yuan Settlement, the Japanese hoped to have their yuan holdings convert-
ible into yen, but China feared the risk of dealing with the strong yen and
consequently the agreement adopted the formula of payment in the British
pound. As a result, while the yen has grown stronger in relation to the pound,
the conversion rate of yuan to the pound has not risen in proportion.
Another problem is that the conversion rates of the yuan to other currencies
are set unilaterally by the Bank of China, and it is uncertain on what basis
these rates are fixed. Nevertheless, judging from the rates quoted by the Bank
of China following the Smithsonian Agreement," the floating of the British
pound, and the latest devaluation of the American dollar, the yuan was listed
below only the yen, the mark, and the Swiss franc in strength, and is subject
to relatively little risk from the pound or dollar.
D. Plant Exports
Prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations with China, the Japanese
government had not decided whether to permit the Export-Import Bank of
Japan to finance the import of plants by China. A prime reason for Japan's
reluctance was the desire to support the government of Taiwan. For example,
in August, 1963, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry approved
the financing by the Export-Import Bank for exports of a vinylon plant of
Kurashiki Rayon Co., Ltd. to China, but the Sato Cabinet disapproved the
plan in 1965. This disapproval was based on a letter from former Prime
Minister Yoshida to the Nationalist Government of Taiwan which stated that
Japan would not approve plant exports to the People's Republic of China
which involved deferred payments. However, with the resumption of full
diplomatic relations between Japan and China, a contract for the export of an
ethylene manufacturing plant to China with financing provided by the Export-
Import Bank was signed in December, 1972. Subsequently, many such plant
11 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 32 (1972).
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export contracts have been concluded on the basis of Export-Import Bank
financing.
As China is now striving for development of a petrochemical industry,
Japan's plant exports have primarily been in that field. In addition, China
is now expanding and modernizing its iron and steel industry, developing
an electronic industry, and improving the transportation network. Accordingly,
the Japan Steel Corporation and Kawasaki Steel Corporation are currently
negotiating for the export of large iron and steel plants. In addition, various
types of ships are being exported, and negotiations for other kinds of plant
exports are in progress. China's import of plants alone from the Western
countries in the next few years is expected to exceed $2 billion.
One potential problem in the export of plants is that China is not a signatory
to the Paris Treaty which assures international protection of industrial pro-
perty. In China all inventions by an individual revert to the state.
E. Technical Cooperation
The Canton Fair is a commodity exchange, but at the same time it is an
important place for the exchange of technology. Technical cooperation be-
tween Japan and China began at the time the protocol concerning friendly
trade was signed in 1962. This technical cooperation was interrupted by the
Great Cultural Revolution, but was resumed at the Canton Fair in the spring
of 1970. At the Fair, the interchange of ideas generally takes the form of an
orientation given by the Japanese manufacturer to the Chinese party im-
porting the item. Normally only the representatives of the Chinese trade
corporations are involved in these interchanges; but occasionally the end con-
sumers of the product become involved, thus giving the Japanese an oppor-
tunity to get an actual "feel" for the people of China.
The Canton Fair is not the only time an exchange of technology oc-
curs; trade fairs opened in China by other countries are also important.
In 1973, Japan held an Exhibition of Japanese Automated Electronic and Med-
ical Equipment. This fair was sponsored by the Association for the Promotion
of International Trade of Japan and lasted for two weeks. At this fair the forty-
two Japanese firms participating held more than four hundred meetings with
the Chinese, thus providing a great opportunity for an exchange of information.
Finally, economic and trade missions from Japan and China have frequently
traveled between the two countries since the establishment of diplomatic
relations. As yet, however, no agreement for scientific and technical cooperation
between Japan and China has been concluded, and a joint committee for scien-
tific and technical interchange has not been organized.
CONCLUSION
The major obstacle to the expansion of Sino-Japanese trade was removed
by the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972. The mutual extension
of most-favored-nation status by the 1974 Japan-China Trade Agreement
should also serve as a stimulus. Thus it appears that the prospect for expansion
of trade between Japan and China is bright.
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One potential problem remains, however-the imbalance in the amount of
goods exported by each nation. As indicated above, the excess of Japanese
exports to China over Chinese exports to Japan has decreased gradually in
the past few years. However, as Japan's exports of plants, iron, and steel con-
tinue to increase, the Japanese must augment their imports in order to reach a
trade equilibrium. Japan now imports fish products, peanuts, fruits, soybeans,
raw silk, rosin, hog hair, and other natural products from China. While demand
for such natural products in Japan will continue to increase, it is obviously
not unlimited. Some hope lies in further expansion of Chinese exportation
of petroleum, coal, iron ore, and nonferrous metals, but the demand for
crude oil in China is also increasing rapidly. For these reasons, China is counting
heavily on the export of processed goods to Japan to balance its trade deficit.
The export of Chinese silk fabrics and clothing to Japan is increasing, and it
is anticipated that the Japanese demand for Chinese furniture, shoes, sundries,
ceramic ware, and fittings will also increase. Perhaps the happiest solution
for the near future would be the development of regional specialization, with
Japan operating heavy and chemical industries, while China specializes in
various light industries.
